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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. In the 1950s, and especially after the first 'Atoms for 
Peace' Conference in Geneva in 19 55, research and 
development on atomic energy was introduced in several 
less developed countries. It was hoped that this would be 
a powerful instrument, not only for their scientific and 
technical development, but also for their general 
progress and modernization. 
Consequently, Atomic Energy Commissions were 
organized nearly everywhere-following the model of 
similar institutions already established in the developed 
countries-and extensive training and research pro-
grammes were put into effect. 
2. A major point in those programmes was the installa-
tion of nuclear research reactors, with foreign technical 
and financial help (mainly US through the Eisenhower 
plan), in different countries: Brazil (1958), Congo (now 
Zaire) and Yugoslavia (1960), Venezuela, Taiwan, Egypt 
and Portugal (1961), Thailand, South Korea and Turkey 
(1962), South Vietnam and Philippines (1963), 
Colombia, Iran and Indonesia (1964 ), etc. 
International aid was channelled to these programmes 
in the LDCs from a special UN agency, the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in 1957. 
3. An evaluation today would show that in the majority 
of cases the net results of those efforts has been quite 
below expectation, particularly in relation to research 
reactors, whose installation it has been suggested was 
'one of the big follies of the late 19 50s' .1 
There are, however, a few exceptions, and Argentina 
is one of them. It is precisely the purpose of this paper 
to show that its atomic energy policy has produced 
useful results in its specific field (production of electric 
power, uses of radiation in medicine, agriculture and 
industry, 'fall-out' control, etc.) and that at the same 
time it has had an important impact in the socio-
politico-economic development of the nation. 
In the analysis of the Argentine case history it is 
important to recognize two features of a general nature: 
(a) that the Argentine atomic energy policy has 
been a 'policy without a bomb'. Nuclear weapons 
were not an objective-implicitly or explicitly-of 
such a policy. The 'bomb' was never in the Argentine 
horizon; and 
(b) that the atomic development took place in a 
country submerged in a very deep political crisis (e.g., 
Argentina has had nine Presidents during the period 
1955-72) and with a permanent economic crises. 
4. Argentine atomic energy policy also has a direct 
bearing on other, more general, science policy Issues, 
such as the following: 
(a) Is it possible to do useful and significant 
R & D in a less developed country in a state of 
permanent crisis and with an economy rather weak 
and dependent? If the answer is yes, what then can be 
done, how and at what price? 
(b) When a country is in crisis, political, economic 
and even administrative troubles and difficulties are 
by definition the norm rather than the exception. In 
such circumstances, what is the role of the scientist 
and the technologist? Is it just to do 'good' science 
and technology like their colleagues in well-organized 
countr-ies, and if this is not at all possible, to blame 
others (politicians, the military, trade union leaders 
and the like) for those difficulties and consequently 
to emigrate or vegetate if they are not solved? 
Or rather is it to understand that their duty is not 
only to do good science, but also to help to build up 
the local frame of reference where R & D can be 
better performed? If so, how will a scientist be able 
to deal with such a wide spectrum of rather complex 
problems which will normally be well outside his field 
of interest and expertise: viz., frequent changes in the 
budget, lack of foreign currency, impossible customs 
regulations, censorship, political persecution, {:Umber-
some administrative procedures, etc.2 
(c) Under such circumstances, what is the best 
training for scientific and technical personnel, general 
or specific?- Basic or applied?-Within the country or 
abroad? 
(d) If instability is the rule, how can an R & D 
institution be organized so that it can function 
properly under permanent troubles? 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE BIRTH AND EARLY GROWTH 
OF THE ARGENTINE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 
5. In Argentina, as in almost every other country where 
atomic energy has been introduced, the history of such 
development is strongly linked to the history of its own 
Atomic Energy Authority-Comision Nacional de 
Energla At6mica (CNEA).3 Unlike steam power, 
which acted in the Industrial Revolution through the 
socio-economic forces of the time, but not by means of 
explicit institutional mechanisms, nuclear energy entered 
into the now-called Scientific and Technical Revolution 
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by means of conscious, explicit and planned efforts. The 
many complex problems of nuclear fission and the fact 
that its first application was the development and 
production of a new weapon, made countries aware that 
its incorporation into society would be accomplished 
faster and better if under governmental direction and 
control. 
So it was that Atomic Energy Commissions were 
founded, organizations of great autonomy and power 
(reporting in most cases directly to the Head of State), 
directly responsible for the development, production 
and utilization of nuclear energy. 
France was the first country to establish such an 
institution, le Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, in 
1945; and other countries soon followed. 
6. It was as early as May 1950 that Argentina estab-
lished its AEC by a decree4 that defined its specific 
'mission': to co-ordinate and promote private and state 
atomic research; to propose to the Executive Power 
those measures necessary to protect the country and its 
population against the effects of radioactivity; to 
propose those measures needed to ensure the national 
uses of atomic energy in the different economic 
activities of the country-medicine, industry, transport, 
etc. According to the same decree, the CNEA 'would 
report to the President through the Minister of Technical 
Affairs'. 
The establishment of CNEA at such an early date 
shows the importance given to atomic energy by the 
then President of Agentina (Peron) and his Government. 
A clearer indication, however, is the big support that 
Peron himself gave to the research work carried out in 
those days by Ronald Richter and his collaborators. In 
fact the 'Richter Affair' is an important episode in the 
history of Argentine atomic policy. 
7. Ronald Richter, an Austrian physicist who worked 
on nuclear fusion under Von Ardenne in Berlin, arrived 
in Argentina at the end of the Second World War. He 
went to the National Aeronautical Institute in Cordoba 
city, to work with a group of European (mostly 
German) scientists and engineers under Kurt Tank, the 
well-known aircraft designer. Richter met Peron, told 
him about the possibilities of fusion and the difficulties 
of fission and proposed a research programme to 
produce energy through controlled nuclear fusion. In 
June 1949, Peron approved the programme and a 
laboratory, the High Temperatures Pilot Plant, was 
installed on Huemul Island in the Nahuel Huapi Lake, 
near San Carlos de Bariloche, a famous winter resort, 
1,900 kilometres from Buenos Aires. Richter was 
designated its director. 
To help him to overcome bureaucratic difficulties, in 
March 1951 Peron delegated 'presidential authority' to 
Richter on Huemul Island. In March 1951, in a press 
conference, Peron announced that Richter had been 
successful in his experiments and that pretty soon 
Argentina was going to be able to produce atomic 
energy, using a very common element. Peron did not 
mention through which process and with what element 
the energy would be produced, but quite obviously he 
was referring to fusion and to hydrogen, especially when 
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he promised that 'we will put a sun in every Argentine 
home'. 
The Peron announcement was received with wide 
scepticism all over the world. It is a fact, however, that 
both in the USA and in the USSR budgets were 
hurriedly approved to speed up fusion ·research work, 
which until then had been going rather slowly. But in 
Argentina the consequences for Richter were negative; 
opposition to him began to develop, even in circles close 
to Peron, and in a few months it was so strong that in 
November 1952 the High Temperatures Pilot Plant was 
closed and Richter relieved of his duties. 
The research work on fusion was discontinued and 
Argentina, from then on, followed the same path-
fission-that other nations were.following. 
8. In October 19 55, a few weeks after the revolutionary 
overthrow of Peron's Government, a new decreeS 
reorganized the CNEA administration but did not 
introduce rna jor changes. In December 195 6 another 
decree law6 was issued which established an 
organization which continued until 1970. CNEA's goals 
were then defined in the following terms: 
(a) to promote and perform studies of nuclear 
transmutations and its application to scientific and 
industrial fields; and 
(b) to control its applications with regard to 
public interests and hazards. 
This legal instrument was complemented in June 
1960 by another decree 7 declaring of 'high national 
interest' the work pursued at CNEA8 and establishing 
that CNEA was a direct agency of the Presidency of the 
Nation. 
9. The following were among other legal measures 
relevant to CNEA: 
(a) A decree law of December 19569 estab-
lished that all raw nuclear materials-and uranium in 
the first place-would be of state property and that 
its exploration, production, and commercialization 
would be the direct responsibility of CNEA. 
(b) A decree of January 195810 regulated the 
uses of radio-isotopes and ionizing radiations, and 
assigned to CNEA all the powers of control on this 
matter. 
(c) A decree of January 196511 ordered CNEA 
to carry on a technico-economical feasibility study 
for the installation of a nuclear power station to feed 
electricity into the Great Buenos Aires Litoral grid. 
(d) A decree of February 196812 authorized 
CNEA to accept the proposal for the installation of a 
320MW nuclear power station and to sign the corres-
ponding contract before 1 June 1968. The contract 
was signed on 31 May 1968 between CNEA and 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft of the Federal Republic 
of Germany. The power station-known now as 
Atucha after the place of its location-is at present 
under construction, has a nuclear reactor fueled by 
natural uranium and pressurized heavy water as 
moderator and coolant, and will be in commercial 
operation by October 1973. 
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III. ARGENTINE ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY: 
ITS MAIN OBJECTIVES 
10. The definition of atomic energy policy has proved 
to be a rather difficult problem in practically every 
country. There is, however, a key factor, the one 
concerning nuclear armaments, that has had the biggest 
influence regarding policy. If a country takes the 
decision to manufacture the atomic bomb, then its 
atomic policy will be dominated by this central 
objective. A country which decides not to make a bomb 
has no such overriding objective and as a consequence its 
atomic energy policy is much more difficult to define. 
11. Argentine atomic energy policy has been a 
'policy without a bomb', the development and manufac-
ture of nuclear weapons never being one of its explicit 
or implicit targets, not even during the Peron-Richter 
period. 
11.1. The foremost objective of Argentine atomic 
energy policy has been to build up an autonomous 
decision-making capability. This has applied across the 
board from decisions on monitoring and controlling 
'fall-out' to accepting or rejecting a nuclear disarmament 
treaty; from choosing a nuclear power station to 
exploring and exploiting uranium ores; from controlling 
the disposal of radioactive wastes in the oceans to 
deciding about the uses of radiation in food preserva-
tion. Argentina's autonomy as a sovereign nation can 
only be deployed if it has the proper 'know-how' to 
choose and to decide. Such a capability does not come 
from the heavens and it cannot be imported from 
abroad: it must be built up. 
11.2. The second main objective is to build up the 
necessary scientific technological infrastructure required 
for the optimum social utilization of nuclear energy. 
Nuclear energy is not a 'wonder', but it is an important 
tool for the development of any nation, provided that its 
society is properly prepared to incorporate it. Nuclear 
energy is an element that can be employed usefully if 
the fabric of the society has the basic ingredients for its 
digestion. As with other new technology, it is essential 
for the country to be an active participant in the process 
of its transfer, and not an idle spectator hoping that 'all's 
well that ends well'. 
11.3. The third principal aim is to provide a 'demonstra· 
tion effect', showing that R & D is feasible and can be 
useful in spite of it being carried out in a country 
immersed in a long and deep socio-political and 
economic crisis. This does not sound like a very specific 
objective for an atomic energy policy, but as a matter of 
fact it was nearly always present in Argentina to all the 
participants in the process. Some decisions were made 
for the explicit purpose of building up the confidence of 
the scientific community. 
12. These three main objectives of Argentine atomic 
energy policy were not defined explicitly in the 1950s or 
even in the early 1960s. 
Being a 'policy without a bomb', its definition was 
very difficult and its implementation cumbersome. 
There were not even good foreign models to be copied 
and so it was not surprising that nobody was then able 
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to write a declaration of principles defining the 
objectives of Argentine atomic energy policy. In fact, as 
we will see in this paper, those objectives were painfully 
worked out during the process, being finally the conse-
quence of praxis plus thought, of thought plus praxis, in 
a recurrent feed-back process. 
The policy was built up by trial and error, through 
failures and successes, until a pattern began to take 
shape and by the late 1960s a definite policy could be 
first recognized and finally defined. How this was done 
will be better understood from an analysis of some of 
the work performed by CNEA in different areas. 
13. Development of human resources 
Throughout its history, CNEA gave first priority to 
the training of scientific and technical personnel. 
Physicists, chemists, biologists, metallurgists, geologists, 
mathematicians, physicians, veterinaries, engineers 
(nuclear, electronic, civil, mining, mechanical), lawyers, 
economists, etc. were trained; but also lathe operators, 
milling machine operators, dye makers, glass blowers, 
carpenters, technicians in chemistry and electronics, 
microscopists, surveyors, cartographers, etc. received all 
kinds of special training at CNEA and many of them 
were sent abroad. 
The relevant feature of this programme was that 
training was not just confined to those areas of specific 
and immediate interest for atomic energy (such as 
nuclear engineering, nuclear physics, nuclear biology, 
uranium metallurgy, radio-isotopes etc.), but it covered a 
broader spectrum under the assumption that: 
(a) The trained personnel, if necessary, could 
eventually be used by the country in fields other than 
atomic energy. And, in fact, this certainly happened: 
at present hundreds of scientists, technologists and 
technicians trained by CNEA are working in 
universities, industry, other government research 
institutions, hospitals, etc. 
(b) It was important to provide the trainees with 
as wide a background as possible, because atomic 
energy-or any other modern technology for that 
matter-is not just a 'package of knowledge' but 
rather a universe in fast evolution. 
How this programme was implemented can be 
illustrated through two specific cases, those of Metal-
lurgy and Physics. 
13 .1. Metallurgy 
It is well known that the development, production 
and utilization of nuclear energy requires a lot of high-
level metallurgical knowledge. Thus, a nuclear reactor is 
one of the most intricate metallurgical 'universes' to be 
thought of: metallurgical problems range from the 
purity of the uranium dioxide used as a fuel to the 
mechanical properties of the pressure vessel that 
contains the core; from the many and complex stages of 
fuel element manufacture to the corrosion resistance of 
the heat-exchange tubes; from the basic physical 
properties (density, thermal conductivity, electrical 
conductivity, etc.) of the different metals, alloys and 
oxides used in the reactor to the more relevant tech-
26 
niques m foundry, forging, rolling, extrusion, welding, 
etc. to be used in their manufacture, etc. 
CNEA then, like any other atomic energy com-
mission, needed to have metallurgy as one of its 
scientific-technological branches; and so in 195 5 it was 
decided to create and organize a metallurgy division. 
To understand how this was done, it is important to 
know that, at the time, metallurgy was not taught as a 
regular subject in any of the Argentine universities, and 
that neither organized, systematic nor modern metal-
lurgical research was then carried out by any govern-
ment, university or private research centre or laboratory. 
In fact, metallurgy was a sort of outcast in the academic 
world, despite the fact that the electro-mechanical-
metallurgical industry already comprised about 25 per 
cent of all Argentine industry and that this sector was 
already more important (30 per cent of GI\'P) than the 
classic agricultural sector (25 per cent of GNP). CNEA 
could have decided to ignore this state of affairs and so 
apply all its efforts to organize a typical nuclear metal-
lurgy laboratory, just the right one for its own specific 
interests, like the Metallurgy Division at Argonne 
National Laboratory in the USA, Chalk River in Canada, 
or Harwell in the UK, etc. 
This would have been the 'easy way'; but CNEA 
chose the 'hard way': it decided that its Metallurgy 
Division would not only give CNEA all the metallurgical 
knowledge that it needed in its atomic energy pro-
gramme (and particularly in the nuclear fuel area) but 
also that it would help Argentine industry to improve 
the quality of its production and the efficiency of its 
processes, while at the same time promoting metallurgy 
as an academic discipline. Consequently, the CNEA 
Metallurgy Division was established along the following 
lines: 
(a) Its personnel would be trained not specifically 
in nuclear metallurgy, but in modern general metal-
lurgy, with a solid background in physical metallurgy. 
(b) Its laboratories and other facilities (library, 
workshops, pilot plants, etc.) would be installed and 
organized in such a way that together with their 
specific work in nuclear metallurgy-mainly the 
development of fuel elements-they could also tackle 
other metallurgical problems of interest to industry. 
(c) It would actively promote academic activities 
in the field of metallurgy, in close connection with 
universities and other government and private 
research centres and laboratories. 
Now, after 15 years of work, a review of the activities 
of the CNEA Metallurgy Division shows the following: 
13.1.1. It has solved all the nuclear metallurgy 
problems identified for it by the CNEA atomic 
energy programme. In particular, it has developed and 
manufactured all the fuel elements for the five 
nuclear research reactors installed by CNEA (see 
16.2) and it has developed a prototype fuel element 
for the Atucha reactor. 
13 .1.2. Its staff has published more than 250 papers, 
mainly in well-established international journals, 
covering a wide metallurgical spectrum: diffusion, 
recrystallization, heat treatment, corrosion, sintering, 




radiation damage, rolling, forging, 
element manufacture, alloy theory, 
dislocation theory, non-destructive 
testing, etc. 
13.1.3. Through SATI (see 17.3.2) it has solved 
nearly 500 problems presented by the electro-
mechanical-metallurgical industry. 
13 .1.4. It has helped to create other metallurgical 
research centres and to incorporate metallurgy as a 
regular subject in the curriculum of several uni-
versities, in Argentina as well as in other Latin 
American countries (Colombia, Peru, Chile, etc.). 
13 .1.5. In the development of human resources: 
(a) Nearly 500 university graduates have 
received metallurgy training at CNEA, some 130 
of them at present working at CNEA, some 280 
with industry, and the rest at universities and at 
other research centres. 
(b) Two hundred technicians have received 
metallurgical training; of these 90 at present work 
at CNEA, 90 are with industry, and the rest are at 
universities and other centres. 
(c) One hundred and thirty Argentine metal-
lurgists went to Europe and the USA for post-
graduate training and research. All of them 
returned to Argentina and the brain-drain from 
this programme has been nil. 
(d) Thirty Ph.D. theses were prepared at the 
Metallurgy Division and approved with honours in 
foreign and Argentine universities. 
(e) Ninety-five Latin Ameri;:an 
technologists received advanced 
training at CNEA and 20 did 
research work. 




It is rather obvious that any atomic energy pro-
gramme requires many good physicists. The Argentine 
situation in 195 5 was as follows: 
(a) There were only 30 physicists in all Argentina, 
and most of these were principally engaged in teach-
ing. 
(b) Some research work was then carried on only 
at the CNEA laboratories, at the Astronomical 
Observatory of Cordoba and at the Institute of 
Physics of La Plata University. 
(c) As an academic discipline, physics was then 
considered at Universities as a kind of Cinderella: 
there were very scarce resources, very few professors, 
few laboratories and a rather small number of 
students. 
The situation became worse during the early 1950s 
due to the harassment and political discrimination 
suffered by the universities during Peron's regime. 
CNEA decided to put into operation an ambitious 
programme through the establishment of a completely 
new institution, the Institute of Physics at San Carlos de 
Bariloche, financed, administered and directed by 
CNEA, although formally incorporated into the 
University of Cuyo for the purpose of granting M.Sc. 
and Ph.D. degrees. The institution was organized follow-
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ing US and European models: full-time staff doing not 
only teaching but also research; a maximum of 20 
students per year living on campus with fellowships 
given by CNEA; well-equipped laboratories and work-
shops so that the students would have plenty of 
opportunity for experimental work; an up-to-date 
library and, last but not least, a beautiful location by 
Lake Nahuel Huapi near Bariloche and 2,000 kilometres 
from Buenos Aires. 
Since 1958, when the first 13 students graduated, the 
Institute at Bariloche (now named after Dr. J. A. 
Balseiro its founder and first director) has graduated 
around 180 M.Sc. in physics, of which more than half 
have obtained a Ph.D. degree; less than 100 at present 
work for CNEA and the rest are at universities and other 
research centres. The Institute is the best school of 
physics in Argentina and it has won a wide international 
reputation. 
13.3. In summary 
The two cases just analysed show that both in metal-
lurgy and in physics the action of CNEA in the develop-
ment of human resources has been wide in scope and 
deep in quality and so it has led to the formation of 
personnel able to do R & D not only in the specific field 
of atomic energy but also in many other fields equally 
important for the scientific and technological develop-
ment of Argentina. 
14. Development of nuclear raw materials 
The first explorations for nuclear raw materials took 
place in 1950. From then on, systematic studies have 
been carried out to find and to develop resources in 
uranium, thorium, graphite, zirconium, berylium and 
heavy water. 
The most important results have been obtained in 
uranium, were reserves equivalent to more than 8,000 
tonnes of uranium oxide U 3 0 8 have been evaluated. 
Potential reserves are estimated to be 13,000 tonnes 
U30 8 . According to the authoritative Resources 
d'uranium (December 1967) published by the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and the European 
Agency for Nuclear Energy, Argentina ranks among the 
first ten nations in the world in uranium reserves. 
With reference to the production of uranium of 
nuclear purity, Argentina has three plants of rather small 
capacity but enough to produce the uranium required by 
the Argentine market. It has been in these plants that 
the 'yellow cakes' necessary for the manufacture of the 
50 tonnes natural uranium of the Atucha's first core has 
been produced. 
It is important to recognize that the technical 
capability now e~ists in Argentina to carry out all the 
tasks, from initial prospecting to the final chemical 
purification. This knowledge has been of paramount 
importance for Argentine's autonomy of decision, 
particularly with regard to the problem of selection of 
the reactor for the Atucha power station. 
15. Development of a nuclear safety capability 
In the context of this paper, 'nuclear safety 
capability' means the capacity that a country has in all 
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matters related to the protection of its population from 
the dangerous effects of radiation and radio-isotopes. 
This is, of course, a very relevant mission for any atomic 
energy commission, and such it has been for CNEA, 
whose authority for monitoring and control is estab-
lished by a law that makes compulsory a permit issued 
by CNEA for the installation of radiation sources and its 
operation, and also for the importation, production, 
commercialization and utilization of radio-isotopes. The 
work of CNEA in this field includes also radiological 
studies of proposed sites for nuclear reactors, R & D on 
radioactive waste disposal and on decontamination 
process, radiotoxicological studies, prevention of critical 
accidents, etc. 
Very closely related to autonomy of decision on 
nuclear rna tters are the studies on 'fall-out'. For years 
CNEA has systematically collected and evaluated all the 
relevant data obtained not only on samples picked up in 
(or on) Argentine territory, but also on the radio-
active deposits accumulated in the turbine walls of 
Argentine commercial aircraft during their regular inter-
continental flights. In such a way, CNEA kept a constant 
watch on the fall-out produced by nuclear explosions in 
different parts of the world. In that way it was possible 
for Argentina to know about the nature of those 
explosions, their magnitude and the possible conse-
quences of their fall-out over the territory of the 
country. This knowledge has proved to be of value in 
several problems, some of them of an international 
nature, such as the non-proliferation treaty. 
16. Development of a techno-scientific capacity 
The way CNEA developed its own techno-scientific 
capacity-a most fundamental tool for any country 
willing to have full command of nuclear technology-is 
illustrated by analysing two concrete cases. Such a 
capacity is much more than just human resources plus 
instruments and equipment plus buildings and ancillary 
resources: all of them are, of course, necessary but not 
sufficient; they need to be integrated into a coherent 
whole. And that is what is shown in the following two 
examples. 
16.1. Nuclear reactors 
In the majority of present LDCs, nuclear research 
reactors have been manufactured in some DCs (mainly 
the US) and then installed by foreign companies. This is 
what happened in all of the Latin American countries 
that have installed research reactors (Brazil, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Mexico and Chile) with the exception of 
Argentina. 
In Argentina CNEA took a very important decision in 
195 7: that its research reactors were not going to be 
bought abroad and imported and assembled by foreign 
companies, but rather they were to be manufactured in 
Argentina and installed by CNEA with the help of 
Argentine industry. This decision was taken under the 
assumption that reactors were important not only for 
training and research in the nuclear field, but also that 
its construction would be essential for the purpose of 
developing a scientific and technological capability. It 
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was reasoned that to manufacture and assemble such a 
complex machine as a nuclear research reactor would be 
an excellent way to develop the indigenous nuclear 
engineering capacity Argentina would need to foster its 
autonomy. The decision acted as an 'ideological cement' 
to bind together the human and material resources into 
an integrated scientific-technological capacity. The 
following are the five research reactors installed in 
Argentina since 1958: 
(a) RA-1. This was put into operation in January 
1958. The design and engineering came from the US, 
RA-1 being a copy of the Argonaut reactor developed 
by Argonne National Laboratory. All RA-1 com-
ponents were manufactured in Argentina, with the 
exception of the electronic and control equipments. 
The assembly and commissioning was performed by 
CNEA personnel. 
(b) RA-0. A critical facility developed to design a 
new core for the RA-1. Its design, engineering and 
construction were Argentine. The RA-0 then led to: 
(c) RA-1 (modified). Core designed at CNEA and 
radically different from the original RA-1. Corres-
ponding changes in the engineering of the RA-1 were 
also introduced. 
(d) RA-2. Argentine design, engineering and 
construction. It was installed to carry on preliminary 
studies for the: 
(e) RA-3. The biggest nuclear research reactor in 
Latin America (originally 5MW, now 8MW). It 
reached criticality in May 196 7 and it was dedicated 
in December 196 7. Designed in Argentina, RA-3 has 
considerable advantages over the conventional swim-
ming pool or tank models, and its engineering-also 
Argentine-introduced some novel features. All of its 
components were manufactured in Argentina, includ-
ing 90 per cent of the electronic and control equip-
ment. RA- 3 is used for research-particularly neutron 
physics and radiation damage-but mainly for the 
production of radio-isotopes. 
Through these five different reactors CNEA 
developed a nuclear engineering capacity that was of real 
importance for the decision to build a power reactor at 
Atucha. 
16.2. Fuel elements 
Just as in 1957 CNEA decided not to import reactors, 
it also decided not to import the fuel elements for those 
reactors but to manufacture them in Argentina. And so 
they were: 
(a) For the RA-1. Flat fuel elements, 'sandwich' 
type, with the 'meat' enriched u3 0 8 in an AI matrix 
and the 'covers' aluminium strips. The 20 per cent 
enriched U 3 0 8 was imported from the USA. The 
design and engineering were also imported from the 
USA, but some important improvements were 
introduced during its manufacture in Argentina. 13 
(b) For the RA-0. Argentine engineering and 
manufacture. The enriched U308 was imported from 
the USA. 
(c) For the modified RA-1. The same as for the 
RA-0, but the enriched uranium was now imported 
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from the USA as uranium hexafluoride, being trans-
formed into oxide in Argentina. 
(d) For the RA-2 and RA-3 reactors. They both 
have the same type of fuel elements, of US design but 
Argentine engineering and manufacture: a uranium-
aluminium alloy cladded with aluminium plates. The 
90 per cent enriched uranium was imported from the 
USA as uranium hexafluoride; for the production of 
the U-Al alloy a completely new process was 
developed by CNEA, a process that has been patented 
in Argentina, the USA, Germany and Japan. 
With reference to all these fuel elements, not only did 
CNEA do the R & D, but it also manufactured all of 
them. Already more than 4,000 units have been made 
and all have performed without failure. It is also 
important to point out that technical innovations were 
introduced in every type of fuel element, proving once 
again that to use an imported design does not necessarily 
preclude innovation, provided that the right kind of 
human resources are properly motivated. 
At the same time this technological activity led to the 
publication of several scientific papers related to basic 
problems in metallurgy. This provides a good demonstra-
tion that a piece of work as specific as fuel element 
manufacture can be the source not only of applied but 
also of basic knowledge. 
16.3. In summary 
The two cases that have been analysed-nuclear 
research reactors and fuel elements-show how CNEA 
built up expertise on the fields of nuclear engineering 
and metallurgy, essential for the development of its 
scientific and technological capability. If nuclear 
reactors and fuel elements had been imported-as in 
other less developed countries-it is rather probable that 
Argentina could not have been able to follow its line of 
autonomy. 
17. Development of a national techno-scientific infra-
structure 
One of the key elements in CNEA policy has been a 
clear understanding of the imperative need to link its 
activities with the rest of the country, mainly to 
industry and the universities. 
17.1. CNEA links with universities 
Some of the more significant activities have been: 
(a) The establishment of research and training 
centres, such as the Centre for Nuclear Medicine 
(through an agreement with the School of Medicine 
of the Buenos Aires University), the Institute of 
Physics 'Jose A. Balseiro' (with the University of 
Cuyo), the Centre for Genetics (with the National 
Institute for Agricultural Research), etc. In every 
case, CNEA was the founding institution and 
provided the original human, financial and material 
resources. All these centres are nowadays very 
important in Argentina and some have already 
achieved an international reputation. 
(b) The organization and support of pre- and 
post-graduate courses in physics, metallurgy, biology, 
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radiochemistry, geology, etc., at several universities 
all over the country. 
(c) The financial support and the technical, 
scientific and administrative facilities to prepare more 
than 100 Ph.D. thesis, that further on were examined 
in different universities. 
(d) The financial aid given as research grants to 
university professors and university laboratories. 
17.2. CNEA links with other state institutions 
CNEA has collaborated closely with several other 
state institutions and state-owned enterprises, and has 
carried on R & D projects with them and for them. 
These projects covered a wide range of subjects: 
nivometric studies for snow-thawing control; studies on 
fertilizers, fungicides and insecticides; studies on 
harbours and port navigability; pipelines non-destructive 
testing; geophysical surveying for oil; behaviour of 
different refractory materials utilized in blast furnaces; 
hydrological studies; wheat and corn deinsectization by 
radiation, etc. The institutions and enterprises with 
which CNEA collaborated were the State Oil Company 
(YPF), the Ministry of Public Health, the State Water-
works Service, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Army 
Research Office, the National Research Council, the 
Central Electricity Generating Board (Agua y Energla 
Electrica de Ia Naci6n), the Institute of Mining and 
Geology, etc. 
17.3. CNEA links with industry 
For any atomic energy programme to be successful it 
is important that the technological level of local industry 
be high. CNEA has therefore helped Argentine industry 
in several ways. 
17.3 .1. Development and promotion of the use of 
new materials and the application of new techniques, 
processes and equipments, both in industrial manu-
facture and in production control. Examples include: 
the development of a new metallographic technique 
for the non-destructive testing of boiler tubes; a 
procedure to measure cellophane paper thickness 
using beta-ray equipment; application of radio-
isotope techniques to study the waste of steel balls 
used in mineral grinding, the measurement of liquid 
levels in industrial tanks, the performance of cement 
furnaces, etc; the control of electronic instruments 
manufactured in Argentina and the development of 
new ones; the use of fracture mechanics techniques to 
evaluate the probable life of pressure vessels; the 
development of a new process to transform soft wood 
into hard wood through polymerization by irradia-
tion; the development of a new furnace for the bright 
annealing of copper, etc. 
An important effort on the part of CNEA has been 
the training of industrial personnel through prepara-
tory and refresher courses on subjects such as 
foundry, heat treatment, plastic deformation, modern 
physical metallurgy, uses of radio-isotopes, etc. 
17.3.2. The most systematic action that CNEA took 
was to link itself with industry through the establish-
ment of SAT! (Service of Technical Assistance to 
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Industry) in 1962. SA Tl was created by CNEA in 
association with the Chamber of Metallurgical 
Industries to be a consultant body to Argentine 
industry in all kinds of metallurgical problems. The 
purpose was to make available to industry the 
scientific and technical resources available at the 
CNEA Metallurgy Division. 
SA Tl was set up to study problems presented by 
industry, but it was also able to propose R & D 
projects that could benefit the performance of 
industry, improving processes already in use or 
opening new lines of activities. Routine matters such 
as mechanical testing, chemical analysis, metallo-
graphic inspection and the like would not be 
performed by SA Tl on the assumption that there 
were already in Argentina other laboratories, private 
and state, that could perform those activities quite 
efficiently. SAT! would also act as a sort of 'clearing 
house' for information, advising customers where 
their problems could be better solved and by whom. 
A rather brief summary of the main activities 
carried on by SA Tl during the last 10 years follows: 
(a) It has studied nearly 500 problems 
presented to it by industry. Some of the problems 
were as trivial as the study of impurity distribution 
in aluminium castings; others were as ambitious as 
the complete development of a new Cu-Zr alloy 
for welding electrodes. 
Some of the problems dealt with by SA Tl were 
quite divorced from nuclear metallurgy-such as 
the development of a new process to manufacture 
tungsten-silver electrodes. Other problems such as 
the analysis of cracks in pressure vessels used by 
the petro-chemical industry were directly related 
to nuclear reactor components. 
(b) It has developed new products and 
processes, such as a new type of refractory 
material to be used in aluminium melting; a new 
process for the manufacture of aluminium 
evaporators for refrigerators; a new type of 
protective atmosphere for bright annealing of 
copper and its alloys; a new method to produce 
tough-pitch copper in small melting furnaces; a 
new type of 'ball-pen', etc. 
(c) It organized a number of seminars, confer-
ences, lectures, round tables, etc. on specific 
metallurgical topics of industrial interest. 
(d) It organized (once or twice a year) special 
courses for the training of industrial personnel, 
some at introductory level, some at a higher level. 
SA Tl has performed two very important functions 
for CNEA: 
(a) It has been (and is) a mechanism for 
coupling R & D with industry, a sort of window 
onto reality. SAT! has helped to make CNEA 
scientists aware of the needs of industry and also 
of its own possibilities and limitations. Thanks to 
SA Tl, CNEA has not been an isolated institution. 
(b) It allowed CNEA to know pretty well the 
real state of technological development of 
Argentine industry, and so to evaluate from a very 
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strategic position the actual possibilities of local 
participation in any big nuclear programme. This 
knowledge proved to be very valuable when the 
Atucha nuclear power station contract was 
discussed. 
18. The very real accomplishments of CNEA should not 
obscure the fact that the Commission has had to face up 
to some major obstacles which have-at times-seriously 
undermined its effectiveness. Relatively few of the 
obstacles were directly political, although the recurrent 
political and economic crises in the country did have an 
indirect effect. 
The principal difficulties have been bureaucratic and 
administrative, and are common to almost all less 
developed countries. They include such factors as rigid 
limitations on the assignment and employment of 
current expenditures, excessive red tape, long delays in 
the decision making process, low salaries, rigid 
promotion system,14 etc. All of _these petty frustra-
tions produced an atmosphere which was inimical to 
creative work and produced a feeling of impotence. This 
sometimes led to the emigration both of professional 
coaches (scientists and engineers) and other technical 
personnel. These reactions were not unique to CNEA 
and permeated throughout Argentine society. 
In addition to leading to extensive migration, the 
vanous obstacles resulted in another manifestation 
typical of much indigenous science in less developed 
countries. Scientists and engineers tried to isolate them-
selves from the rest of society and wrap themselves in a 
cocoon of 'good science'. They did not realize that their 
responsibility was wider in scope and that it included 
their important contribution to building up the frame of 
reference where such 'good work' could take place at all. 
They were, in fact, assuming quite wrongly that 
Argentina was a country already built and consequently 
that science and technology could be developed as 
smoothly as they were in the developed world. They 
demanded a coherent policy as an essential prerequisite 
for them to be able to do science, a very demanding 
request in a society that was not in a condition to define 
any policy at all. In fact, in those circumstances, a policy 
cannot be given, it must be built up. 
Such naivety made them ask for an order, a security 
and a continuity that no country in crisis could ever 
offer. Scientists and technologists were looking for a 
'strategy for order', while the only possible one was a 
'strategy for chaos' and so like children they claimed for 
a world of dreams instead of facing the reality as it was 
and assuming its corresponding responsibilities. For 
many of them, emigration was the only answer to 
finding the necessary peace and security to do R & D; 
but it was also a way of escaping the most fundamental 
problem facing any intellectual in a less developed 
country, his own contribution to the eradication of 
underdevelopment! 
These difficulties meant that CNEA did not use its 
human resources as efficiently as it should, nor were the 
basic disciplines coupled as efficiently as possible to 
technology, and the administrative and managerial 
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services were not well organized. All this had a bad 
influence on some important ptogrammes, namely: 
(a) the local production of uranium which was 
several years behind schedule; 
(b) the construction of the RA-3 research reactor 
which was finished three years behind schedule; 
(c) a long delay, and final blow, for the project to 
build a 40MW power research reactor that would have 
provided a lot of experience for a bigger and better 
participation in Atucha; 
(d) the very sparse work, and of rather poor 
quality too, in important subjects such as heat trans-
fer, fluid mechanics, system analysis, etc. 
It is obvious that the whole set of obstacles, all opera-
ting simultaneously and feeding back one to the other, 
seriously damaged atomic development in Argentina, 
probably led to a five to eight years' delay in the 
scheduled programme. 
It is more important, however, to realize that 
obstacles of this kind will not disappear until some other 
big changes take place in Argentina, but it seems that 
such a wonder will take quite some years to happen. 
Meanwhile it is in such a country (the only one we have 
got!) where R & D must be performed, more and better 
if underdevelopment is going to be defeated. 
IV. THE ATUCHA NUCLEAR POWER STATION 
19. In January 1965 and through a Government decree, 
CNEA was ordered to prepare a Feasibility Report, 
analysing the possibilities of installing a nuclear power 
station in the geographical region known as the Great 
Buenos Aires Litoral, where the demand for electric 
power was then estimated to increase by i,300 MW in 
the period 1966-72. This was the beginning of a process 
that put a severe test on the degree to which CNEA 
objectives-as described in III-had been really achieved. 
Could autonomy of decision be exercised in all the 
different stages from feasibility studies to final com-
missioning of the reactor? Atucha was, in fact, the hour 
of truth for Argentine atomic policy and for that reason 
it is worth a careful analysis. 
20. The feasibility report 
20.1. Even in 1965 the common practice in Argentina 
was to contract feasibility reports and pre-investment 
studies with a foreign con~ulting firm whenever the 
project was of an advanced nature or one requiring 
heavy investment and financing from external sources. 
CNEA decided not to contract the nuclear power station 
feasibility report commanded by the Executive Power, 
but rather to prepare it under its own direction and 
responsibility, and with its own scientific and technical 
personnel. Private consultants, both foreigners and 
natives, would be hired for specific problems when 
necessary. Two main reasons lay behind this decision: 
(a) to follow a policy consistent with the previous 
decision not to import nuclear research reactors or 
fuel elements, a line of 'learning by doing'; and 
(b) to provide a 'demonstration effect' against the 
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usual practice of hiring foreign consultants for work 
that could be done perfectly well using indigenous 
talent. 
CNEA was also convinced that the study itself would 
be of importance even if the Government were 
eventually to decide not to build a nuclear power station 
at all, but only so provided that the study was 
performed by CNEA personnel. 
To carry out the work, a special task force of about 
15 full-time CNEA members was organized under the 
direction of an Executive Committee whose members 
were the CNEA chairman and the managers of the 
CNEA Energy and Technology branches. 
20.2. The study was finished within the time limit given 
to CNEA (14 months) and the report-nine volumes, 
two principal ones and seven annexes-was presented 
exactly on the programmed date. It was a comprehensive 
document,lS covering the technical, economic, 
financial, political, legal, social and health problems 
inherent in the installation and operation of a nuclear 
power station, as well as its impact on such matters as 
the conservation of natural resources, the development 
of Argentine industry, the possible changes in socio-
cultural patterns, etc. Four types of nuclear power 
station (two with natural uranium reactors and the other 
two with enriched uranium reactors) at two different 
power levels (300MW and 500MW) were thoroughly 
analysed and then compared. both among themselves and 
with two conventional thermal power stations (oil-fired) 
used as standards of reference or alternative solutions. 
The main conclusions of the study were as follows: 
(a) by 1972 the Great Buenos Aires Litoral power 
system would be technically ready to incorporate a 
nuclear power station to its grid; 
(b) in such a grid, a nuclear power station could 
be operated during its 25 years of life as efficiently, 
safely and reliably as any conventional modern 
thermal station; 
(c) the installation and operation of the proposed 
nuclear power station would be competitive, in 
economic terms, with the conventional thermal 
station used as a standard; 
(d) the site chosen for its installation was Atucha, 
about 100 km north-west of Buenos Aires city, on 
the west bank of the Parana de Las Palmas river; 
(e) from the point of view of the safety of its 
operation and the health of the neighbouring popula-
tion the nuclear power station could be operated in 
conditions equal to other industrial complexes such 
as petrochemical industries, integrated iron and steel 
mills, etc.; 
(j) it could provide an important source of 
contracts for Argentine industry in the installation 
and operation of a nuclear power station; 
(g) a nuclear power station would mean the 
utilization of uranium resources already discovered in 
Argentina, and this would make a significant addition 
of a new fuel to the traditional line of oil, carbon and 
gas; 
(h) Argentine scientific and technological develop-
ment would certainly benefit quite significantly from 
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a project like Atucha, whose effects would extend 
quite beyond CNEA's own boundaries. 
The report ended by advising the Government to 
install a nuclear power station in Atucha and by request-
ing authorization for CNEA to call for offers and to 
negotiate with possible suppliers. The Government 
approved and so began a new and more complex stage. 
21. The negotiations 
21.1. To buy or sell a nuclear power station is much 
more than a simple commercial operation, particularly 
so when it is the first one and it is imported or exported. 
This is true for the buyer, and importer, because in so 
doing it enters into the 'nuclear age' with all its political, 
technical, and socio-cultural implications and conse-
quences; it is true for the seller, and exporter, because it 
is the opening of a new market and also a way to 
increase the political influence upon, and the technical 
and socio-cultural penetration into, the country that is 
buying. The main consequence is that governments, not 
only companies, must be heavily involved in the negotia-
tions of the deal. This explains some of the decisions 
taken by CNEA prior to any request for offers: 
21.1.1 About the fuel. The debate on 'natural or 
enriched uranium' as the most convenient fuel for a 
nuclear power station has been going on for years 
everywhere. The only exceptions are the USA and the 
USSR where the choice was not very difficult since 
both countries are producers of enriched uranium. By 
1972, the debate was over in almost all the developed 
countries where the problem has been definitively 
settled in favour of 'enriched uranium'. France was 
the last country to switch to 'enriched' after a long 
battle between the Commissariat a l'Energie 
Atomique, which favoured 'natural', and Electricite 
de France, which favoured the other. Canada is now 
the only country offering to supply natural uranium 
power stations. 
The situation is, however, not settled yet in the 
less developed countries, where the fear of becoming 
even more dependent on the developed countries 
through the supply of enriched fuel makes the choice 
very difficult, particularly so in those cases where the 
country has enough uranium ore resources to produce 
its own natural fuel. If the choice is difficult today it 
was much more difficult in the mid-sixties, when 
France was very active in the market (it sold a 600MW 
natural uranium power station to Spain). The most 
successful stations then in operation were the natural 
uranium Calder Hall type built in the UK, and Brazil 
was in favour of the 'natural' line. 
In Argentina there was also a strong group 
supporting the view that Atucha ought to be 'natural' 
and, therefore, that only 'natural' offers should be 
accepted. There was also the opposite group which 
claimed that the natural uranium reactors were a 
thing of the past, and that every country would 
become 'enriched' in a few years. The utili-ties also 
preferred the 'enriched' power stations. 
The final decision taken by CNEA and supported 
by the Government, was a very pragmatic one: 
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natural uranium would not be selected a priori, but 
offers would be accepted in both fuels, enriched and 
natural, and the choice could then be made after a 
careful comparison of concrete offers, and not be just 
a selection in vacuo. 
CNEA thought that in this way it would induce 
fierce competition among suppliers (and also 
countries!) and so it would then get better offers. It 
was the CNEA position at the time that if it was true 
that natural uranium had important advantages for 
Argentina, it was very important to quantify them 
and the only way to do so was through a comparison 
among different offers. 
21.1.2. About the power level. The feasibility report 
demonstrated that the most convenient power level 
for Atucha was 500-SSOMW and that it would have 
been rational to ask for offers at that power level. 
However there was at a high Government level a 
powerful group, backed by the Secretary of State for 
Energy, completely opposed to any nuclear power 
station. Only after a hard battle did they accept the 
idea of a 300MW power station but they would never 
agree to a SOOMW one. Now, a restriction of offers at 
the 300MW level meant that the French would 
automatically be out of the running, because the 
economy of any gas-cooled uranium reactor is very 
poor below SOOMW. CNEA considered that it was 
important to have the French in the race, so it was 
finally decided that offers could be presented both at 
300MW and at SOOMW. 
21.1.3. About the tender. Once the decisions on fuel 
and power were taken, it was just impossible to call 
for a formal tender as it is defined and prescribed by 
Argentine law. At the same time, a formal tender 
would restrict flexibility, a condition that CNEA 
considered to be fundamental for the negotiations. 
The decision was made then that a 'call for offers' 
would be made instead of a formal tender. 
21.1.4. About delivery time. When the Secretary of 
State for Energy finally accepted the Atucha project 
it was on condition that the station be in commercial 
operation not later than July 1972. He argued that by 
that date a 300MW deficit on the supply side would 
appear and only for that reason would a thermal 
station-nuclear or conventional-then be necessary. 
This meant that the delivery time for the Atucha 
power station had to be only 48 to 52 months. A 
very short time indeed. 
21.1.5. About financing. Another important a priori 
decision was that financing facilities ought to be 
included in every offer, so that once the final choice 
was made the financing of the project would be 
automatically secured. Two main reasons lay behind 
this decision: 
(a) CNEA was convinced that the big interest 
in selling nuclear power stations (the market was 
then clearly a buyer's market) and the fierce 
competition among possible suppliers would result 
in very favourable financing conditions; 
(b) CNEA was also convinced that the usual 
sources of international finance, such as the World 
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Bank, the Inter-American Bank and other similar 
institutions, would not consider a nuclear power 
station for Argentina to be a high priority project. 
In the particular case of the World Bank it was 
suspected at the time that it was not especially 
inclined to support any big project in Argentina. 
21.1.6. About fuel elements. It was clear to CNEA 
that the supply of fuel elements for Atucha and any 
subsequent power stations would be a key element in 
any atomic energy programme, not only due to its 
technological and economic importance (Atucha 
alone would consume about US$2,500,000 yearly in 
fuel elements), but especially because it would 
guarantee a full command of the fuel policy. It was 
then decided that offers ought to include explicit 
references to the manufacture of the fuel elements in 
Argentina and the conditions under which the 
corresponding technology would be supplied. 
21.1.7. About local participation. As a matter of 
policy CNEA was deeply interested in making Atucha 
the point of departure for a nuclear sector in 
Argentine industry. To achieve such a purpose CNEA 
specified that the offers for the Atucha project ought 
to contemplate a maximum of participation of the 
local industry, covering not only traditional items 
such as civil engineering, ancillary services and the 
like, but also important components of advanced 
design and technology. 
21.2. Once the a priori conditions were determined 
CNEA launched its appeal for offers and at the same 
time began preliminary negotiations with prospective 
suppliers and their corresponding Governments. The 
time limit for the presentation of offers was 31 July 
196 7, by which date 17 different offers had been 
received. 
The attitude of the Governments of the supplier 
countries played an important part in the negotiations 
and for this reason they will be summarized here. 
21.2.1. Negotiations with the French. The negotiations 
round began with the French. They were the first 
because they had shown deep interest in the Atucha 
project early on, even when the feasibility study was 
still in its first stages. Likewise, CNEA was also 
interested in a gas-cooled reactor because this was one 
of the few possibilities for a natural uranium power 
station. Therefore negotiations were opened and a 
French mission visited Argentina and inspected the 
site at Atucha. This was followed by an Argentine 
mission (CNEA officers and Argentine industrial 
entrepreneurs) which visited Chinon and Saint 
Laurent des Eaux, in France, where nuclear power 
stations were in operation or under construction. A 
draft of a provisional letter of intention was then 
prepared by a French-Argentine team. 
These negotiations were suddenly broken off by 
the French in a most extraordinary and unorthodox 
way: after having promised to present a provisional 
offer by a certain date, the French completely failed 
to produce the offer either at the stated time or later 
and even failed to notify CNEA that no offer would 
be prepared. 
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This was, of course, the end of negotiations with 
the French_16 
It is interesting to note, however, that at that time 
France was negotiating with the US the supply of 
enriched fuel for the first French atomic submarine. 
It was said both in Paris and Washington that one of 
the conditions that the American Government 
imposed ·upon the French Government in that deal 
was that France would not follow up the negotiations 
with the Argentinians. It is hard to believe that the de 
Gaulle Government would tolerate such an inter· 
ference in internal affairs, and it is harder still to 
imagine the USA being worried with what was 
happening in Argentina in nuclear matters. This was 
no more than a rumour but unfortunately no 
explanation has ever been given to account for such 
uncommon behaviour in international dealings. 
21.2.2. Negotiations with the British. CNEA tried 
first of all to get an offer for a Calder Hall type 
nuclear power station, but the British refused, 
because they were no longer selling that type of 
station. Instead, they offered an Advance Gas 
Reactor (AGR) type, the new nuclear power station 
developed by the UK Atomic Energy Authority and 
which was already under construction for the Central 
Electricity Generating Board. Apart from the fact 
that no AGR was then in commercial operation and 
so no experience of its performance was available, the 
main problem with the AGR was that it used 
enriched uranium. 
CNEA then asked the British where the enriched 
fuel for Atucha would come from? The answer was 
that Argentina could get it from the USA under a 
lease agreement, a type of tri-lateral agreement which 
was admitted by American law. CNEA agreed to 
follow that procedure but only if the UK Govern· 
ment would give a full and written guarantee that it 
would provide enriched fuel (from any source) if as a 
result of any problem between Argentina and the USA 
the fuel supply should become discontinued. 
The British negotiators were a bit surprised at this 
condition but finally accepted it and in due course 
they informed CNEA that the UK Cabinet had agreed 
to extend the requested guarantee. 
This was an important step forward for CNEA, 
because it proved that it was possible to get enriched 
uranium from other sources than the USA. However, 
the British were far less flexible in other aspects of 
the negotiation such as local participation, fuel 
element manufacture, financing and, especially, 
delivery time. They finally informed CNEA that 48 
to 52 months was far too short a period in which to 
build and put into commercial operation an AGR 
type power station. 
21.2.3. Negotiations with the Canadia11s. CNEA was 
most interested in the Canadian heavy water natural 
uranium power station. This was because in addition 
to using natural uranium it also had the added 
advantage that its design and engineering made it 
particularly suitable for high local industry 
participation. 
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The use of a calandria and pressure tubes instead 
of a big pressure vessel makes it possible for a semi· 
heavy electro-mechanical-metallurgical industry like 
the Argentine one to have a rather important partici-
pation. CNEA in fact opened negotiations with the 
Canadians with every expectation of arriving at a final 
deal. 
But the deal did not go through, for several 
reasons. In the first place the Canadians were not 
willing to accept an important Argentine participa· 
tion, furthermore they were quite reluctant to accept 
that the fuel elements could be manufactured in 
Argentina; they doubted that the delivery time could 
be accomplished and the financial conditions were 
not the most favourable. Contrary to what was 
expected by the Argentinians at the beginning, the 
negotiations were not smooth; from the CNEA point 
of view, things went wrong because the Canadians 
behaved as if they were sure winners, they seemed to 
think that Argentina had no other choice but to buy 
'Canadian'. Consequently they did not show too 
much initiative and flexibility, particularly when it 
was more necessary, at the initial stages of the 
negotiations, and when they finally reacted it was 
already too late. 
21.2.4. Negotiations with the Americans. These 
negotiations were quite curious, because the two 
main American companies involved-Westinghouse 
and General Electric-did not show much interest in 
presenting offers. They were not aggressive as usual, 
but rather very cautious, behaving as if they were 
convinced that there was not going to be any nuclear 
power station at all in Argentina; they seemed to 
think that at a certain time the Argentine Govern-
ment would finally call off the game. 
In Argentina, some were quite happy with this 
strange behaviour because they believed that CNEA 
would be in a better position to take a decision if the 
'big brother' pressure were not at all present. Other 
people, however, did want to have American offers 
because without them it would not be possible to 
compare natural uranium vs. enriched uranium and so 
they tried hard to get firm quotations from both GE 
and Westinghouse. Finally Westinghouse was 
convinced that CNEA 'meant business' and presented 
an offer worthy of consideration. 
21.2.5. Negotiations with the Germans. Two German 
companies presented offers: AEG offered a boiling 
water enriched uranium power station (under GE 
licence) and Siemens, a heavy water (under pressure) 
natural uranium power station, a new design based on 
a Westinghouse concept and developed by Siemens. 
The German Gover~ment backed both offers with 
tremendous interest, showing at all times that it was 
very keen on selling a nuclear power station, almost 
certainly because it would be the first one to be 
exported from Germany. 
It is worthy of mention that all the financial 
negotiations with the German authorities were quite 
fluid and flexible, much more so than had been the 
case with other Governments. The Siemens offer was 
34 
the one finally chosen by CNEA, for reasons to be 
explained below. 
22. Evaluation and choice 
2 2 .1. A total of 1 7 offers were presented to CN EA by 
the closing date (31 July 1967) and the evaluation began 
at once. The work was performed by the same team that 
prepared the feasibility report, under the same Executive 
Committee, and in consultation with other branches of 
the Government such as the Secretary of State for 
Energy, the Ministry of Industry, the National Develop-
ment Council, the Ministry of Economy, the National 
Security Council, etc. By December 1967, the study was 
finished and its conclusions were submitted to the 
Executive Power, which made the final choice in 
February 1968. A brief description of how the offers 
were analysed, every one on its own, and then compared 
among themselves and also with respect to a conven-
tional thermal power station of similar electric character-
istics, will provide another instance of autonomy of 
decision based upon scientific and technical capability. 
The offers were quite complex, and so it was 
necessary to take into consideration no less than 70 
variables for each one. Those variables covered such 
items as: the type of fuel; the total cost of the station; 
the total amount of financing; the interest rate; the 
nature and scope of guarantees; the moderator; the 
turbine; the buildings; the delivery time; the participa-
tion of local industry; the experience of the supplier in 
the nuclear and in the electric business; the estimated 
generating cost of the station once in operation at a 
steady state; the manufacture of fuel elements; the cost 
of insurance; the problems of heavy equipment trans-
portation; the estimated reliability of the station once in 
operation; its flexibility to follow the estimated load 
curve; the participation of Argentine scientists and 
technicians during design and construction; the safety 
conditions; the control and inspection by CNEA and 
other authorities during manufacture and assembly of 
the components; etc., etc. 
A 'comparison matrix' was drawn, with the names of 
the offerers in the columns and the variables in the rows. 
Appropriate 'weights' were given to each variable accord-
ing to a priority ranking established by the Executive 
Committee. 
22.2. It is interesting to analyse some of the main con-
siderations taken into account in assigning 'weights' to 
the variables, as is shown in the following few examples: 
(a) Fuel. This was taken as the most important 
variable of all, but not so much as to become the 
'decisive' variable. An offer with the right kind of fuel 
and nothing else, could be 'out-weighed' by one with 
the wrong kind of fuel but with maximum 'points' in 
all the other variables. Natural uranium got 100 
points and enriched uranium 0 points. However, the 
fuel offered by the British company got 30 points in 
spite of being enriched, because CNEA was informed 
by the UK Government that it would guarantee the 
fuel supply from other sources besides the US. The 
US companies offered fuel from only one source 
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(their own country) while the German AEG also 
offered it only from the US. 
(b) Financing. Financing got very high priority, 
particularly with respect to the total amount to be 
financed, not only for the obvious reason of chronic 
foreign currency shortage in Argentina, but also 
because CNEA was trying to make sure that once the 
actual construction started, nothing would stop it; 
and it is common in Argentina for public works to be 
stopped half-way through, due to lack of fiscal 
money. This is another instance of planning ahead, 
assuming that crisis in Argentina is the norm rather 
than the exception. Consequently, offers that 
proposed 100 per cent financing would get the 
maximum number of points while others would get 
far less. 
(c) Technical data. Every offer would be 
thoroughly technically analysed and this would 
include not only the nuclear, but also the conven-
tional, part of it, particularly the turbine generator. 
With respect to the 'nuclear island', it was agreed to 
give more points to the most experienced one, but 
the proolem was not, in 196 7, as simple as it could 
be now. At that time the Calder Hall type had the 
most world experience in nuclear power generation. 
They had then produced far more kWh than any 
other type in the world. The Pressurized Water 
Reactor (PWR) type was the second best, but only 
so far as experience in nuclear submarines was con-
cerned. As far as previous experience was concerned 
the worst offer was that of Siemens, because there 
was only a 50MW prototype in operation. 
(d) Economics. Here, the usual elements were 
taken into account, with special care being taken to 
make the offers as homogeneous as possible for the 
purpose of comparison. This applied particularly to 
the fact that the total contract cost could be less 
important than the final cost when generating costs 
are estimated and introduced, so that a more 
expensive buy at the moment of signing the contract 
could be the cheapest one after running for some 
years. 
(e) Local participation. A lot of attention was 
given to this item, a very important and rather 
difficult one. CNEA did not want a typical 'turnkey' 
contract for a 'black box' but nor did it want a 'white 
box', that is, a situation where CNEA itself should be 
the architect-engineer for the project (simply, CNEA 
was not in a position to perform such a task). The 
solution was to get a sort of 'semi-turnkey' contract, 
corresponding to a semi-open 'black box', or what 
might be called a 'grey box'. Consequently, points 
ought to be assigned accordingly to how 'grey' the 
box offered happened to be. 
For each of the remaining main variables a similar 
ranking operation was performed and 'weights' assigned. 
Once the matrix was covered by these numbers, a 
'quasi-quantitative' selection could be made and a first 
provisional choice arrived at. 
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22.3. The Siemens offer 
22.3 .1. The main characteristics of the Siemens offer 
were as follows: 
• Fuel: natural uranium. 
• Fuel elements: natural uranium oxide pellets in 
zircalloy tubes. Very long fuels (more than 
6m. ), quite thin and altogether a very complex 
component to manufacture, manipulate and 
use. 
• Moderator and coolant: 300 tonnes of heavy 
water under pressure. 
• Financing: 100 per cent financing, including 
local costs, at 6 per cent interest, repayment in 
25 years, the first instalment to be made 6 
months after the station was operating in 
commercial conditions. 
• Local participation: estimated at 35 per cent, 
including some items of complex technology. 
The contract offered was not a 100 per cent 
turnkey contract. 
• Power: 320MW 
• Contract prize: DM 280 million. 
• Moderator cost: US$25.50/pound. 
22.3.2. As applied to the Siemens offer the 'ranking 
procedure' described in 22.1 and 22.2 gave the 
following results: 
It got the maximum points on fuel, financing, 
local participation and delivery time. On the other 
hand, it got zero points under 'actual experience of 
the reactor offered'. Under other items it got medium 
values. None of the offers based on enriched uranium 
got enough points to overtake Siemens, which had a 
clear advantage as a result of its four 'firsts'. The UK 
offer was technically the best of all, but it could not 
beat Siemens because the financing offered was only 
80 per cent of the total amount, the delivery time 
was more than 52 months, and the local participation 
allowed was evaluated as rather low, since it did not 
include components of real technological importance. 
However, the score on many items was quite even 
between Siemens and the Canadian offer. Fuel was of 
the same kind in both offers, but the Canadian fuel 
elements were of simpler design and better tested 
than those of Siemens. Also the Canadian 'nuclear 
island' had better engineering and its simplicity made 
it quite suitable for Argentine industry participation. 
Far more important, the future of the Canadian type 
of nuclear power station is obviously brighter than 
the one offered by Siemens. 
For other items (economics of generation, modera-
tor, proposed guarantees, reliability, health physics, 
etc.) both offers were quite similar. Siemens was 
better on financing, delivery time and the proposed 
local participation. But finally it was on another three 
items where Siemens had the definite advantage: 
(a) Balance of trade: It was far more con-
venient for Argentina to buy from Germany, a 
traditional buyer of Argentine goods, than from 
Canada, whose trade with Argentina was quite 
low, both countries in fact being competitors in 
the world market. 
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(b) A comparison between the relative 
'strength' of both companies was quite favourable 
to Siemens, second only to General Electric (USA) 
in the world ranking of companies manufacturing 
and selling heavy electrical equipments. It was also 
considered important that Siemens had a branch in 
Argentina, very active in all kind of public works 
and so with a lot of experience about local con-
ditions. 
(c) During negotiations, it was notorious that 
the German Government was supporting Siemens 
with all its technical and economic might. It was 
evident that for Germany the deal was far more 
than a commercial one and that a lot of prestige 
was involved. From the perspective of its 'strategy 
for chaos' it was important for CNEA to know 
that in case of any big problem during the con-
struction of Atucha the German Government 
would help Siemens in every respect. 
23. A balance 
It is apparent from what has just been described that 
the Atucha project was a nodal point in Argentine 
atomic development. It was then thatalmost 15 years of 
hard work to build up a decision capability was to be 
tested in a very intensive exercise. It was a strenous 
effort but absolutely worthwhile because it showed to 
what extent Argentina had full command in a field as 
new and complex as nuclear energy. 
But Atucha was also a turning point. Before it, CNEA 
followed a rather tortuous path trying to find its way in 
a very muddled world. Consequently, programmes and 
plans were quite sketchy and a lot was more implicit 
than explicit. However, once the Atucha project was 
chosen, the contract signed and the actual construction 
begun, CNEA had a very clear path to follow. And it 
certainly did follow it. 
23.1. CNEA was involved in all matters related to the 
actual construction of Atucha. Its scientific and 
technical personnel did work on civil engineering, 
nuclear engineering, metallurgy, neutron physics, health 
physics, non-destructive testing, electronics, mathe-
matics systems, analysis, fuel elements, etc. CNEA also 
obtained an important degree of participation for 
Argentine industry, including the introduction of new 
technologies such as the welding of stainless steel vessels, 
the manufacture of special tubes for heat exchangers, 
etc. 
23.2. CNEA prepared a concrete nuclear programme 
(the so-called Plan Nuclear Argentino 1967-77) 
which, besides other concrete projects, includes two 
nuclear power stations (600MW each) to be installed 
before 1980. This explains why from 1968 on, every 
Development Plan for Argentina adds a new source of 
energy (nuclear) to the conventional ones (fuel and 
hydro) and a new fuel (uranium) to oil, gas and carbon. 
After Atucha, CNEA could and did define precise and 
specific objectives. The uncertain times were over and 
nuclear energy became fully incorporated into the 
common socio-economic activities of the country. 
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V. SPIN-OFF 
24. So far this paper has described how Argentine 
atomic energy policy was defined and implemented; it 
has also shown that the main objectives of that policy 
have been achieved, particularly the capability for 
autonomous decisions in all matters related to atomic 
energy. Throughout this process an important spin-off 
has been produced and this deserves to be analysed in 
some detail. 
24.1. Spin-off in the education and academic field 
(a) Several scientific and technological disciplines 
were open to academic activities: nuclear medicine, 
nuclear biology, nuclear metallurgy, reactor engineer-
ing, reactor physics, etc. 
(b) Physics, metallurgy, geophysics and geo-
chemistry, genetics, electronics, analytical chemistry, 
etc. were strongly developed and more than a 
thousand persons at undergraduate and graduate level 
were trained. 
(c) New academic institutions were founded 
(Sociedad Argentina de Metales, Sociedad de 
Medicina Nuclear, etc.) and other already-existing 
institutions were supported (Asociaci6n Fisica 
Argentina, Asociaci6n Quimica Argentina, Sociedad 
Argentina de Biologla, Union Argentina de Mate-
m:iticas, etc.). 
(d) The publication of more than 1, 300 scientific 
papers in well-established international journals 
helped to improve the quality of the scientific work 
everywhere in Argentina by setting new and higher 
standards of excellence. 
(e) Hundreds of scientists from the USA, Canada, 
the UK, Western Europe, etc. visited Argentina and 
important links were established between the 
Argentine scientific community and the international 
community. Many Argentinians became members of 
the 'invisible college'. 
24.2. Spin-off in the industrial field 
(f) New techniques, processes and materials were 
introduced in many different industries. 
(g) New standards of quality and control were 
defined and put into operation. 
(h) The successful participation of local industry 
in Atucha opened new opportunities not only 
through a better industrial capacity but also through 
an important 'prestige' effect that operated in the 
following way: 'If our industry was able to manufac-
ture such and such a component for a very complex 
project like Atucha, of course it will be able to do the 
same for any other project that will obviously be 
simpler than a nuclear power station.' This kind of 
argument proved to be quite effective in several large 
projects where Argentine industry obtained a sizeable 
participation. 
(i) As industry became involved with atomic 
energy, a background for a future Argentine nuclear 
industry has been built. 
(j) SA TI taught several important lessons about 
the crucial problems of how to introduce R & D into 
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the industrial sector and how to link the scientific 
and technological infrastructure with the productive 
structure. 
24.3. Spin-off in science policy and related matters 
(k) The paper has already shown the importance 
of CNEA to the achievement of the major science 
policy objectives of technological independence. In 
addition to this the CNEA programme has demonstra-
ted how important it is to develop an indigenous 
capability in R & D. 
(l) It has shown that the choice is not between 
'dependence' and 'autarky' as is usually presented in 
many very hot debates, but rather that 'autonomy' is 
the most convenient and feasible objective to be 
achieved. It is not 'imported technology vs. native 
technology' which matters, but an autonomous 
capability to manage and control all the technology 
flowing through the economic system. 
(m) CNEA experience has also been important in 
producing a sizeable increase in self-reliance and 
confidence in the indigenous ability to achieve a full 
command of rather complex technologies. 
24.4. Finally, the most important lesson has been the 
following one: 
For scholars in general, and scientists in particular, 
'science policy' must necessarily be presented in a well-
written document, where everything is logically and 
consistently organized. It is also thought that such a neat 
document must precede any action. But reality is, of 
course, quite different; not only because policy is often 
not defined in such a way, but when it is so the nice 
document is immediately ignored or changed, either by 
the very same people who wrote it or by the next 
minister in the same Government (the half-life of 
ministries is usually very low!) or in a new government. 
A science policy, a technological policy, an atomic 
policy, etc., will not come from top to bottom, and so 
to wait for it to happen will be just 'to wait for Godot'. 
Those policies must grow from the roots and through 
the action and work of everybody concerned, primarily 
the scientists and technologists. CNEA experience is 
that 'organic growth' is the answer, whereas 'organized 
growth' is no more than a dream. 
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APPENDIX 
SOME FIGURES ILLUSTRATING THE EVOLUTION AND PRESENT POSITION 
OF THE NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION OF ARGENTINA 
1. The total money outlay of CNEA between 1950[17] 
and Decerpber 1972--excluding expenditures connected 
with the Atucha power station[18]-amounted to 
US$205 million, distributed as follows: 
Personnel US$61.5 million 
Investments US$71.5 million 
Current expenditures US$72.0 million 
2. The budget for 1972 amounted to US$12.8 million, 





Current expenditures US$2.9 million 
3. By December 1972 CNEA had a total personnel of 
2,970, falling into the following categories: 
Scientific and technical 920 
of which holding 
professional degrees 





4. Other figures relating to human resources: 
Number of: 
CNEA scientists by 1952 5 
Persons in receipt of 
training at CNEA 
Persons in receipt of 
training abroad 
Foreign experts that 
collaborated in the 
training of personnel 
Foreign students (mostly 
Latin American) in receipt 





1. G. Oldham, Science, Technology and Development, 
Institute of Development Studies, Special Paper No. 2 
(University of Sussex, November 1966). 
2. j. Sabato, 'Quality vs. quantity in scientific research: the 
special case of developing countries', Impact of Science in 
Society, 20, 3 (1970). 
3. j. Sabato, 'Energia atomtca en Ia Argentina', Revista 
Estudios lnternacionales, 2, 3 (October-December 1968). 
4. Decree No. 1093/50' signed by the then President of 
Argentina, General Peron, and his ministers. 
5. Decree No. 384/55 signed by the then Provisional President 
of Argentina, General Lonardi, and his ministers. 
6. Decree-law No. 22498 signed by the then Provisional 
President of Argentina, General Aramburu, and his ministers. 
NOTES 
5. The following are the main CNEA installations: 
Headquarters in Buenos Aires (Av. del Libertador, 
8250): 
a five-storey building housing the office of the 
President of the Board, administrative offices, the 
main library, the central workshop, and the 
physics, chemistry and biology laboratories. 
Atomic Center Constituyentes (CAC) in the outskirts 
of Buenos Aires: 
comprising metallurgy and nuclear engineering 
laboratories located in several buildings distributed 
over an area of 12 acres. 
Atomic Center Ezeiza (CAE) a distance of 25 kilo-
metres from downtown Buenos Aires: 
a 2,000-acre site comprising an 8MW research 
reactor, health-physics laboratories, a fuel-repro-
cessing facility, a pilot plant for industrial irradia-
tion and several laboratories. 
Atomic Center Bariloche (CAB) at San Carlos de 
Bariloche, Rio Negro Province: 
compnsmg laboratories, workshops and living 
quarters for teaching staff and students. The J .A. 
Balseiro Institute of Physics is also located at CAB. 
Cordoba Factory in the city of Cordoba, 800 kilo-
metres from Buenos Aires: 
concentration, refining and purification of 
uramum ores. 
Malargue Factory in the south of Mendoza Province, 
1,000 kilometres from Buenos Aires: 
production of uranium yellow cake of nuclear 
purity. 
7. Decree No. 7006/60 signed by the then President of 
Argentina, Dr. Frondizi, and his ministers. 
8. In those days to be declared of 'high national interest' was 
just another gimmick to get through the bureaucratic net. 
Unfortunately, the gimmick was so widely used by so many 
other institutions that finally it lost its original power and is now 
only another rhetorical ornament. 
9. Decree No. 22477 signed by the then Provisional President 
of Argentina, General Aramburu, and his ministers, and further 
regulated by decree No. 5423 of May 1957. 
10. Decree No. 842/58 signed by the then President of 
Argentina, General Aramburu, and his ministers. 
11. Decree No. 475/65 signed by the then President of 
Argentina, Dr. IIlia, and his ministers. 
12. Decree No. 749/68 signed by the then President of 
Argentina, General Ongania, and his ministers. 
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13. The changes were introduced in the co-extrusion stage of 
manufacturing, resulting in an improved final product. This 
know-how was eventually sold to an important German 
company. 
14. Throughout this period there was a considerable degree of 
stability in CNEA's top management. There were only three 
Chairmen of the Board in 18 years, and the present incumbent 
has been in office for 15 years. 
15. In 1967 the Vth National Congress of Engineering presented 
the Feasibility Report with the National Award in Engineering. 
Atomic energy in Argentina 
16. CNEA never got any explanation for this strange behaviour 
and so it is rather difficult to find out what really happened. 
17. Figures relating to the Richter period are not very well 
known because a good part of the money came from the 
so-called 'secret funds' of the Executive Power. 
18. The Atucha power station-at a contract price of DM280 
million-is not paid for out of the ordinary CNEA budget. 
